Russell Gull
151st FA Bn., 34th Division
Attached to the 36th from Sept. 9 to 24th

"D" Day 9 Sept. 1943: The battalion, loaded on Dukws was debarked in a calm sea at 0130 hours in the Gulf of Salerno. One "C" Battery Dukw, carrying a 105 mm. howitzer, gun crew and forty rounds of ammunition, was rammed while rendezvousing and sunk. All equipment was lost but personnel were uninjured and were rescued by other Dukws in the vicinity, The night was extremely dark but general direction could be obtained by the glow of fires in the crater of Mount Vesuvious which we knew to be south-east of Naples.

At 0200 hours an ICVP manned by naval personnel reported to the battalion commander to guide the battalion to Green Beach. A course of 140 degrees was followed for thirty minutes to get into the mine-cleared channel and then an easterly course of 64 degrees was established to the beach. In the darkness infantry personnel-carrying-craft cut through our column and separated Batteries "B" and "C" from the remainder of the battalion.

In the British sector near Naples to the north of us, heavy naval gun fire was heard and great flashes lit up the sky at H-30 hours (0300 hours) as the naval preparation was being laid down prior to the beaching. Nothing could be seen or heard from the beaches in front of us. The day before "D" day, the Captain of our LST had Informed us that there would be no naval preparation on our beaches. We were not sure about the amount of resistance that we would encounter in view of Italy’s surrender but we were prepared for any eventuality.

At 0630 hours the infantry still had not secured Green Beach which was under extremely heavy machine gun, mortar and artillery fire that extended a thousand yards out to the sea. The column, unable to land through the heavy curtain of fire was turned back to sea until out of range and an effort was made to find and reorganize all elements of the command.

Plans were made to land on Red Beach. Lt. Col. DuBois ordered a radio de-waterproofed and a message sent to 36th Division Artillery apprising them of our intent but no answer was received. Naval patrol boats meanwhile ordered the battalion to land on Red Beach which was not being shelled as heavily as the others. By this time many of the Dukws had run out of gasoline and some delay occurred in the refueling.

The first Dukw carrying Lt. Col. DuBois, Major Surdyk, and 160 rounds of ammunition landed on Red Beach at 02725 hours with leading elements of the second wave of infantry which had also been substantially delayed by the heavy hostile fire. Guns were unloaded from the Dukws and sent to battery positions without any attempt being made at reorganization by battery because the situation demanded immediate supporting fires.

Consequently battery commanders found themselves with guns from other batteries and even officers from organizations other than their own. Three guns of the 36th Division Artillery which had been landed ahead of their units and did not know where to go, were attached to Captain Constant’s battery and sent into position with him. These guns were later sent to one of the 36th Division’s battalion, when Captain Constant displaced to an anti-tank position.

Enemy artillery and mortar fire on the assembly area was heavy and speedy evacuation of that area was necessary. Two or three men of the battalion sustained slight shell fragment wounds but did not report them until some time later. A battalion radio net was established but no contact could be made with 36th Division Artillery.

Captain Constant and Captain Vaught placed their guns, along with the "strays" from the 36th Division, into positions just forward of the dune line. It was necessary to place these guns and deliver fire immediately because the infantry, less than fifteen hundred yards forward of the beach, had no supporting fire other than their own light machine guns.

One Liaison officer and three forward observers had been dispatched to the infantry as soon as the first Dukws were beached and fire was directed on enemy mortars and machine guns as soon as the batteries were laid. Captain Stewart, the liaison officer, continued on with the forward infantry elements and was among the first to reach the crest line of the western extremity of Mount, Solprano.

Caption Holloran and Lt. Young with a composite battery had gone into position in a grove near the south wall of the ancient ruins of Paestum and just west of Highway 18. At 0930 hours, seven Mark IV tanks attacked the position. The battery destroyed two tanks and drove off the remainder, but the gun crews were forced to evacuate the positions under heavy machine gun fire which came from the south end of the grove on their right flank. Later it was disclosed that the fire was delivered by some of the tanks that had concealed themselves there to deliver a parting shot.

The personnel was assembled by Major Surdyk and Captain Smith who were on position area reconnaissance and told to take cover near the town wall of Paestum and to await further orders from them. There were no infantry in the immediate vicinity to the officers obtained an armored half-track and went forward with the intent of silencing the machine gun and retaking the position.

Upon finding the enemy dispersed and the material intact except for the Dukw that had been set afire by the machine gun fire, the gun crews were returned to their posts and the battery continued in operation for the remainder of the day. Captain Holloran, who had been forward during the entire incident, returned to join Lieutenant Young, who remained in the vicinity of the battery position during the attack and evacuation.

At 0900 hours Lt. Col. DuBois ordered Captains Vaught and Constant to take positions north of Paestum, close to the field of fire for anti-tank defense. The positions were selected, flanking the 36th Division command post. Shortly thereafter he received a message from Captain Vaught to the effect that a tank attack was coming.

At approximately 1000 hours Captain Constant’s battery encountered an attack by seven Mark IV’s at eight hundred yards. There was an exchange of several rounds of ammunition in which the battery obtained hits on two of the tanks and broke up the attack although none of the tanks was Immobilized.

Between 1030 and 1330 hours a total of fourteen Mark IV’s attacked in Captain Vaught’s sector. The battery burned up or completely destroyed five of these at ranges varying from two hundred to a thousand yards and dispersed the others. One gun under the the command of Lieutenant Walsh had to be sited on the road to obtain a field of fire. Much difficulty was experienced in firing this piece because the trail spades could get no purchase in the hard surface.

After each round was fired the gun was driven into the ditch and had to be manhandled back into the firing position. Private Heitman of "A" Battery suffered a broken ankle when the gun struck him after one round. It was necessary to drag him from the position. In spite of these difficulties this gun succeeded in destroying three tanks. Lieutenant Fitzgerald, First Sergeant Boyce Murphy and Staff Sergeant Frisk, all of "A" Battery as well as Sergeant Ek of "C" Battery were wounded in this action by fragments of high explosive shells fired by the tanks.

During the initial attacks in this vicinity, Brigadier General Myles Cowles Commanding General of the 36th Division Artillery, was in the battery area and aided Sergeant Frisk in the service of his piece. The general shifted trails with the efficiency of a finished cannoneer and caused the sergeant to remark later to his crew that the general was the highest priced number five man that he had ever commanded, but also one of the most dextrous and cooperative.

Lt. Robertson left the anti-tank positions and went to a building where he established an observation post in an effort to adjust indirect fire on the retreating tanks. He encountered a battery of the 132nd Field Artillery which was going into position in that area and arranged to observe for them. While this battery was being laid, the Battalion Commander of the 132nd arrived with the other two batteries. Before an adjustment could be started however, the fast moving tanks disappeared around Mount Soprano beyond observation.

Prior to departure from Bizerte we were given the responsibility of dispatching ammunition carrying Dukws, which were loaded on our convoy, to the battalion position areas of the 36th Division Artillery. Since the 36th carried only twenty rounds per battery on the landing, we deemed this mission sufficiently important to send an officer to guide each ammunition train to the battalion to which it was assigned.

At 1000 hours, Lt. Bentley was proceeding west across Highway 18 towards the Paestum railroad station, the vicinity in which the 132nd Field Artillery was to go into position. As he neared the station an enemy Mark IV tank rounded a bend at a distance of about three hundred yards from the Dukw. Bentley, armed only with a forty-five caliber pistol and a firm believer in the maxim, "discretion is the better part of valor", leaped from his perch atop the three tons of high explosive ammunition and took off into the brush along with the Dukw drivers, who he never saw again.

The tank, evidently equally frightened by this amphibian monstrosity ground to a halt, reversed gears and disappeared from view in its own cloud of dust. After quitting that area, Bentley ran to our nearest gun position for two or three hours aiding the executive in repelling tank attacks from various quarters then suddenly remembered his unaccomplished ammunition delivery.

He returned immediately to the spot where he had left the load of ammunition and as he approached within a hundred yards of it a shot rang out and the Dukw was enveloped in a sheet of flame and a cloud of black smoke. After successfully frightening off a Mark IV tank and occupying the center of action of several tank attacks, the Dukw fell prey to the ever enthusiasm of a "trigger happy" 37 millimeter infantry gunner. The lieutenant seated himself upon a rock and pondered briefly the futilities and inconsistencies of war and then went about his business.

At 1500 hours we were given permission to fly our airplanes off of the flight deck which had been especially constructed for us on the LST. Lieutenant Feinberg flew off without incident although the ship was rolling in an offshore swell. Lt. Fleming, however, did not fare as well. As he neared the end of the runway on his take-off the LST suddenly rolled and the aircraft struck the Bofors anti-aircraft gun in the bow of the ship. The airplane pitched over the bow and fell into the water. Fleming managed to slip his safety belt off and kick his way out of the cabin just before the ship ran directly over the airplane. He sustained some cuts about his head and face but was rescued by a small boat and given medical treatment.