C.N. (Red) Morgan
3rd Bn, 141st Infantry

My name is C. N. (Red) Morgan. I joined the 141st Infantry Regiment as a Captain while the regiment was still on the Rapido River. I was assigned as CO 3rd Bn 141st Inf. Previous to this time I had served with the 142nd Infantry Regiment since mobilization of the 36th Infantry Division.

The remaining troops of the 3rd Bn were still in position along the River manning observation posts and a sparse (sparse because of the heavy losses suffered while crossing the Rapido River on January 21-22) defense in the event a counter-attack was launched by the enemy. These troops had been through a nightmarish experience, yet, they were still ready to fight if they could see any justification for it. One might say they were a bit dejected but, not defeated. I was amazed at the courage of these officers and men and continued to be amazed all the time the 3rd Bn was in action in the Cassino area. I found that if I was ever feeling low, that the best way to reassure myself was to have a chat with some of the officers or men of the line companies.

I was fortunate that the officers and men of the 141st took me in. From the day that I arrived I felt that I had been accepted. I felt that there were many officers in the Bn and in the regiment that could have taken over the Battalion.

Even though the Bn was decimated, the probability of being ordered to make another attack across the Rapido was always with us. It seemed that periodically we were alerted to be ready to cross at a certain time. Fortunately these alerts were all cancelled.

At one time the Bn was ordered to make preparations for an attack across the river south of Cassino. The Bn was to have tanks attached from Lt. Col Felber’s 753rd Tank Bn. I thought that we would probably launch this attack. It was just wild enough to be ordered. I visited the 753rd Tank Bn CP. Col Felber was familiar with the plan. Then my S-3 and I reconnoitered the area below Cassino for possible crossing sites.

Simplified, the plan was to cross the Rapido, each Rifle Company was to have tanks attached. Each unit would seize a designated objective and then pursue the Germans down the Liri Valley. It was a beautiful plan on paper. It sounded very much like a mission that might be assigned to an armored division in exploiting a breakthrough.

From this trip of reconnaisance and coordination we arrived back at the 3rd Bn CP in the early hours of the morning. The next day I was ordered to Corps Hq to present this plan. In the meantime I had received orders designating the crossing site.

Before I left for Corps Hq, Lt Col Andy Price, Regt-Exec-Off of the 141st, told me that Lt Col Wyatt, Regt CO 141st, wanted to remind me to give the strengths of the units as they were included in the plan.

At Corps Hq, it seemed that as much preparation had been made for my briefing as if it had been a plan for committing the entire Corps.

The briefing was held outside. There were rows of chairs filled with Generals, Colonels, and lesser brass. I would estimate that there were 50 or 60 present. I couldn’t help but think that if all of them were shipped to the 3rd Bn, the combat strength of the Bn would almost be doubled. As I gave the mission of each company, I would say, "I Company with 18 men will—etc." When I had finished, there were no questions and no suggestions. The next day the attack was called off.

Each day of rest, if one could rest under such uneasy circumstances, was helpful to the officers and men of the Bn. On about the 6th of February the Bn was relieved and moved into a bivouac area in the vicinity of San Vittore. The Bn looked better all the time. Here the men had a chance to clean up and get some restful sleep in spite of the constant firing of artillery batteries in the immediate vicinity. No one in the Bn tried to guess what the next mission would be. I think we all had an idea that it would be another trip across the river.

The Bn received a few replacements of officers and men and some personnel returned from the hospital.

I believe it was on the night of Feb. 9-10, that the Bn was moved by truck to a point on the river north of Cassino. We dismounted and began to walk. We crossed the Rapido and moved into an assembly area in the vicinity of some Italian Army Barracks. Yes, the Bn had crossed the river again. This time the crossing was by courtesy of the Gallant 34th Div, our sister regiment, 142nd Infantry Regiment, and the French Army. Here the river was fordable.

When the 1st and 3rd Bns were moved into the assembly area, an officer was appointed in each Bn to bring the troops up on order. The 1st Bn CO, Capt. Erman Newman and I with our staffs were guided up a long winding trail to a Regimental CP of the 34th Div. Here the Regimental CO (34th Div) briefed us and furnished guides to lead us to a Bn CP of the 34th Div. This was the Bn that we were going to augment or relieve. At that time we did not know which. This Regt CO apparently still had his sense of humor. His parting phrase was, "I want a corner room of the Abbey for a CP."

We found the Bn Hq in a dugout on the reverse slope of a hill (number unknown) located about 1,000 yards from the Abbey of Monte Cassino and 300 yards east of Snake’s Head. The Bn CO gave us all the information he had. As he pointed out his positions on the map, we began to suspect that everything was not in accordance with what we were previously led to believe. Our reconnaissance of the area confirmed this. We set out to reconnoiter the area. We went along a trail that passed in front of a small house. The house was full of personnel of the 34th Div. Here some medics were attending wounded personnel. The dead were stacked outside awaiting evacuation by mule.

We proceeded on up the trail to a rocky mass. This mass was to be known later as Snake’s Head. Here were soldiers of the 34th Div. The soldiers were friendly in spite of the fact that our movement would immediately bring down small arms and artillery fire on their position. These soldiers had literally gone through hell in the last two weeks. I am sure that they were glad to see anyone come in that might be of some help. We walked by these soldiers thinking that they were in reserve or support. We had a map and thought we knew where we would find the forward elements. We moved on hoping to get to a stone wall. There was an opening in the wall. One of the soldiers yelled something to the effect that we should go no further. He did not have to repeat his warning. Bursts of small arms fire came over the wall and through the opening. The rest of the reconnaissance was conducted with care.

After this reconnaissance, Capt. Newman and I returned to the small house. We decided that this would be the CP for both Bns. Lt. Shamburger, Commo Officer, 3rd Bn 141st, had a line in to the 141st Regt. CP, soon after we arrived. Darkness had fallen. Here we had a chance to confer with the company commanders and the battalion staff officers of the battalion of the 34th Div.

Capt. Newman and I and our staffs had had a long climb up the mountain trails but, we were not hampered by heavy equipment. It had started to rain. The rain had turned to snow. We were sure that by then the trail was a muddy slippery mess. The men were carrying equipment necessary for survival and whatever they could that was necessary for launching an attack.

There was talk of another attack by the 34 Div. Troops against hill 593. This attack was to be launched during the night of Feb. 10-11. After they had reached their objective, we were to attack through them. This attack failed to materialize. The few survivors of the 34th Division on Snake’s Head, after more than two weeks of bitter fighting were utterly exhausted. The attack was called off. The 1st and 3rd Bns of the 141st would relieve the troops of the 34th Div. on Snake’s Head.

The 1st and 3rd Bns 141st arrived after their long struggle over the slick mountain trails. Relief of the 34th Div. Troops on Snake’s Head was accomplished and by the morning of Feb. 11, the 1st and 3rd Bns were in position.

An attack was scheduled for 1100 that day, Feb. 11, 1944.

Confusion reigned that day. The only thing that kept the Germans from overrunning our positions was the tenacity and guts of the officers and men of the line companies.

Capt. Newman and I had spent much time on the telephone convincing higher echelons that we were not where they thought we were. To get where they thought we were, we would have to move at least 100 yards forward. That 100 yards was across an area that did not necessarily have to be occupied in force. To borrow a phrase from WW I, it was a "no man’s land". The Germans could effectively contain this area by fire from adjacent positions. In addition the Germans had had enough time to prepare fortifications on hill 593. In these positions the Germans kept enough personnel to keep us honest at all times, including the times when visibility was poor. The Germans also had routes available from other positions that offered concealment for attacks on our positions. The Germans had the advantage of planned supporting fire. They knew the terrain. They wanted our position on Snake’s Head. It was a key position offering excellent observation for the protection of the Germans from any direction.

The 1st Bn was to lead off on the attack with the 3rd Bn in support. The terrain was such that there was little room for deployment or maneuvering.

The following items are extracts from Robert L Wagner’s, "The Texas Army" . . .

The Germans from their defenses on 593 launched two counter-attacks during the afternoon against the two battalions of the 141st on top of the Snake’s Head. One, of major proportions; occurred at 12 noon and the other, of lesser significance, at 4 p.m. Both were repulsed with heavy enemy losses but the effect was to neutralize the 141st’s attempts to advance. By 4:45 p.m. their strength, in position, had been reduced to 10 officers and 66 enlisted men (1st Battalion) and 12 officers and 94 enlisted men (3rd Battalion). (End of quote)

When the attacks and counter-attacks were over, the two battalions wound up relatively on the same line that they had taken over from the 34th Division. The Germans were in command of the situation on hill 593. Their meat grinder was ready to grind up any troops that we were willing to throw in. To appreciate the truth of this statement, one must consider the outcome of future actions taken by fresh full strength units of Allied Troops.

The counter-attacks mentioned in the quotes above were, as usual, preceded by heavy supporting fire.

In repulsing these counter-attacks, mortars and machine guns were used when possible. Our most effective weapons were rifles and grenades. When these are your most effective weapons, it takes good men to use them. Thank God for those good men. At the risk of seeming facetious, I might point out that rifles and grenades are very ineffective against planned artillery fire. The range is a little short.

The Germans seemed to have plenty of ammunition. They delivered harassing mortar, artillery and rocket fire as though they had enough to last forever. They did not hesitate to throw in a serenade of these weapons at any time. They also had an ample supply of small arms and grenades and were not reluctant to use them. The Germans continued their strong aggressive patrolling.

At about 1700 Feb. 11, the combined strength of the 1st and 3rd Bns was about 20 officers and 150 enlisted men. The normal complement of the combined strength of these two battalions would have been approximately 70 officers and 1,600 enlisted men. Pursuant to a telephone message from Lt Col. Wyatt, CO 141st Inf, the two Bns were combined under Capt Newman and I was designated as Exec. Off. This was a wise move. There had been no friction between Capt. Newman and me. No two People can be in charge of the same mission. Capt. Newman was a fine officer. I respected his judgement. He had commanded the 1st Bn for some time, including, the time of the ill-fated Rapido River Crossing. He was a rock on which we depended during the remainder of our stay on Snake’s Head. I repeat, the 141st infantry Regiment had many fine officers. At that time, our mission was changed. We were to hold our positions at all costs.

During daylight hours, practically any movement of any member of the battalions could be observed. As a result, practically any movement brought in small arms fire as well as the heavier ordnance. The small house used as the Bn Cp was about 75 yards down the trail from the company positions. At times the entrance was covered with small arms fire. To hesitate in that door was hazardous. A few yards down the trail from the house was a stretch of about 150 yards that must have been under observation by many German positions. On this stretch of trail any movement, including litter bearers and patients on litters, was subject to small arms fire. Giving the Germans the benefit of the doubt, let us say that litter bearers and patients were hit by small arms fire when visibility was poor and the firing had been directed toward movement. Of course the shells of indirect fire weapons have no eyes.

Walking wounded were carefully screened. We could not spare a man that could still throw a grenade or fire a rifle. Those few walking wounded that were evacuated were warned to stick to the trail. The odds that they would be killed, wounded again, or lost were high.

The mule trains usually came in after dusk. Capt. Jack Brown, 3rd Bn S4, usually came in with them. Capt. Brown still kept his sense of humor in spite of the long perilous climb up the mountain. The trails were covered by German artillery, interdictory and observed. It was not impossible for enemy patrols to infiltrate to positions along the trail. Frequently, mules and men were hit. The men and officers of the Bn kidded Capt. Brown, good-naturedly about his rear echelon job. Capt. Brown knew how important it was to get the much needed supplies to us and to evacuate the dead.

Our only dependable means of contact with Regimental Hq was by telephone and messenger. The commo sections did an excellent job of keeping the telephone lines in operation. Enemy shelling cut the lines time after time. The breaks were repaired in short order. Lt. Shamburger, 3rd Bn Commo Officer, was a morale booster. His sense of humor was appreciated by all. His expressed wish was to kill an enemy by hitting him over the head with a EE8 telephone. I believe that he may have meant it. If I had asked that section to lay a line to the Abbey itself, they would have tried it.

I wish that I could report that we finally won out and took our original objectives: hills 593, 569, and 374. This was not to be. Again the 1st and 3rd Bns of the 141st had been assigned an impossible mission. I doubt if we could have done it if John Wayne had been with us.

Two understrength battalions had taken their equipment over a long, slippery mountain trail for an attack across a line of departure that had not yet been taken. I can imagine that some pencil pusher in a higher echelon had already placed a pin or a line on an operations map designating where he thought the Bns would wind up. Long before the Bns were up the hill, orders for their next attack would be issued.

A dot or a line on a map does not indicate the situation. Only the personnel on the actual terrain can see the situation. A thin line on a 1:25,000 map in front of Snake’s Head could have included both the Allied and the German positions many times. Yet, that line seemed to mean to some higher command that U.S. troops were dug in on the forward slopes of hill 593. Where there is a difference of opinion, the higher echelon should send a representative for an on the spot reconnaissance.

A tradition for this regiment had been set at the Alamo. If there is such a thing as a resurrection and a hereafter, surely the defenders of the Alamo welcomed those men and officers of the 141st Infantry that were killed on the Rapido River, in the battle for hill 593, or in defense of the lower slopes of hill 706. I would think that those ghosts of the Alamo smiled benignly on all members of the 141st in their past and future actions and welcomed their dead into the fraternity. I would like to think that they had a great respect for the members of all other units of the 36th Division, the 34th Division, and for the units of all the other nationalities that fought in the Battles for Cassino.

Hill 593 was to haunt the allies for four months. Initially the gallant, tired, depleted 34th Div had moved onto Snake’s Head and tried to take hill 593. The Royal Sussex tried to take hill 593. In turn, the Gurkhas of the Fourth Indian Army tried to take all of hill 593. Finally, in the latter part of May, the Polish Army mopped up the German rearguard on hill 593 that had been left to cover the withdrawal of the German Army from the Cassino area. All of these units paid dearly for their efforts. I would like to know the total number of casualties suffered by the Allied Troops in assaults on hill 593 alone. The bleak rocky terrain of Snake’s Head and hill 593 is bathed in the blood of the heroes of many nations.

In the words of General Fred L Walker,

"How long, pray, will it be until the high command learns that assigned missions must be within the capabilities of the troops and that victories are not won by wishful thinking."

There must have been some tears shed when the 1st and 3rd Bns were relieved from duty on Snake’s Head, but, those tears had to be in memory of the brave men who died there.

On the night of Feb. 13-14, the 1st and 3rd Bns 141st, were relieved by members of the Royal Sussex Brigade. We were moved about 1500 yards to the northwest. There we joined the 2nd Bn of the 141st. The CO of the 141st, Lt Col. Wyatt, had been killed in his CP near Cairo, on the 13th Feb. The Regt Exec. Off., Lt Col. Price, had been seriously wounded at the same time. Lt. Col. John C. L. Adams who had been recently assigned as CO 2nd Bn, was then named Regt. CO. The 2nd Bn was in a defense position on the southern slopes of hill 706. They, too, had had their troubles. The 1st and 3rd Bns were assigned the mission of defending the draw between the southern slopes of hill 706 and the positions held by the New Zealanders.

On the 15th Feb., we had a ringside view of the bombing of the Abbey of Monte Cassino. I must admit that I shared the same feeling that most of the Allied Troops had on the Abbey. We felt that it was a German stronghold and observation point. We had been under the impression that we had been fired on from the Abbey while we were on Snake’s Head.

On about the 21st Feb., H and M Companies’ Mortar Platoons helped break up a counter-attack apparently aimed at Snake’s Head. Lt. H. L. Bond, M Company Mortar Platoon CO, had used his initiative and placed his OP in an advantageous position. He and his Sergeant spotted the counter-attack forming, called for, and observed the fire. When the mortars were finished firing, the score with the Germans was closer to even.

The newly appointed Regimental Commander began to think up ways of harassing the enemy. One of his ideas was to put all machine guns on the forward slope of the regimental sector and open them up in the direction of the enemy. Capt. Newman and I were for anything against the Germans that was practical. We admired his spirit, but, as I recall neither one of us thought that it was practical at the time.

Rather than to immediately voice an objection to this action, I suggested that before this was to be done the guns should be dug in. In this rocky terrain, digging without explosives would be practically impossible. This meant we would have to have engineer assistance. If the emplacements were prepared for the machine guns, whether they were used for the original purpose or not made little difference. From a defensive standpoint, the holes would pay for themselves. From an offensive point of view, the holes could be used for overhead supporting fire from the machine guns or any other appropriate supporting weapon. At the time the situation was still fluid. We could at any time be defending against a formidable attack or, as we had learned from previous experience, we could be ordered to attack at any time. I called the regimental S-3 and explained our [situation]. The S-3 then called the G-3 and requested appropriate engineer assistance.

The engineers got right on the job. Col. Oran C. Stovall, 36th Div. Engineer, came up and personally supervised the task. There was no question as to need or purpose. The machine gun emplacements were blasted out of solid rock. Col. Stovall and his engineers were exposed to artillery fire the whole time they were working. Working with explosives under artillery fire must have been a spinetingling business. The explosions attracted German Artillery fire just as the machine guns would have. Thanks to the courageous efforts of Col. Stovall and his men the machine gunners of the 141st would have some protection when the shells came in. The engineers did not have this advantage. The average infantryman didn’t realize that our combat engineers were frequently put in perilous situations. In many instances the engineers have preceded the infantry and literally paved the way for them. In the words of someone, probably, Col. Stovall, "The combat engineers are combat infantrymen with a trade."

While the 141st was in this position the Gurkhas had relieved The Royal Sussex on our left. We received a replacement officer. He was a sight to behold. He was wearing cavalry boots and breeches with coat and scarf. He provided a break from the monotony of war. He had been caught in an artillery concentration while crossing "Purple Heart Valley". He had lost all of his equipment except his carbine. His barracks bag and footlocker had been torn to shreds. His first assignment was to establish liaison with the Gurkhas. He was still wearing the same clothing when he left for the Gurkhas. The Gurkhas shot first and asked questions later. He was fired on and taken prisoner. He was taken to Gurkha Hq. He was able to establish his identity and make friends with the Gurkhas. He returned later with an escort and a highly prized Gurkha knife. He had been gone so long that I thought we had lost him. He turned out to be a fine officer.

On about the 28th Feb., the 141st Infantry Regiment was relieved and sent back for rest, replacements and refitting.

Did the assignment of the 141st Infantry to two impossible missions within a period of three weeks kill the spirit of this regiment? I assure you that it did not. I had the privilege of being associated with the 1st and 3rd Bns later. Their courage was undaunted. Is it unusual that I should love this regiment and resent any comments against it?

Afterthought: I do not believe that the 3rd Bn 141st and the 753rd Tank Bn missed any chance for glory when the attack was cancelled.